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City diplomacy: breaking gridlocks?
Cities have captured the imagination of many practitioners and analysts across 
the globe. It is now commonplace, well beyond architecture and planning circles, 
to hear the inescapable ‘urban age’ mantra that ‘more than half of the world’s 
population lives in urban areas’ and that ‘by 2050’ this proportion might grow to 
as much as two-thirds of humanity.1 Cities have proved to be critical engines of 
the global economy, global information flows, and worldwide mobility of goods 
and people.
Yet cities are not just an increasingly critical context for an urbanizing twenty-
first century. They can be effective actors, taking part in the dynamics of global 
governance. This active engagement is both reflected in, and bolstered by, the 
rhetoric emanating from most multilateral processes, like the Sustainable Devel-
opment Goals, involving cities. As we argue throughout this article, the extent 
and persistence over the past two decades of the development of city networks 
give a clear sign that cities are indeed participants in the architecture of world 
politics. This active participation is reflected in the often-cited assertion that 
while ‘nations talk, cities act’.2 Variously attributed to a number of city leaders, 
the statement embodies much of the leadership ethos of former Mayor Michael 
Bloomberg in New York City’s tenure (from 2010 to 2013) as chair of the C40 
City Leadership Group—perhaps the best example of the increasing prominence 
of cities in global policy agendas. In short, cities are ‘out there’ in world politics, 
lobbying, linking, planning and cooperating; and they are doing all this, often, in 
formalized groups—city networks.
* We owe a note of thanks to some extraordinary colleagues, Mika Morissette, Jack Doughty and Yvonne Yap-
Ying, for their support in developing the dataset. We thank Simon Curtis, Elizabeth Rapoport, Jan Melissen 
and Agis Tsouros for support and comments on the project. Earlier versions of the dataset in this article 
were presented at forums including the WHO International Healthy Cities summits in Athens and Kuopio 
(October 2014 and 2015), the Charhar Institute Shanghai ‘City Diplomacy’ symposium (October 2014), and 
the International Studies Association annual convention in Atlanta (March 2016). Research has been funded 
by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) under grant ES/K007742/1.
1 On the ‘urban age’ rhetoric, see Neil Brenner and Christian Schmid, ‘The “urban age” in question’, Inter-
national Journal of Urban and Regional Research 38: 3, 2014, pp. 731–55. On urbanization trends, see Gordon 
McGranahan and David Satterthwaite, Urbanisation concepts and trends, working paper (London: International 
Institute for Environment and Development, 2014).
2 Simon Curtis, ed., The power of cities in international relations (London: Routledge, 2014).
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We aim here to offer a preliminary guide to what city networks are, and what 
they do in contemporary world politics. We base our analysis on a comprehensive 
review of a database of 170 city networks constructed in 2015 to represent the 
range of formal organizations of cities in national and international affairs. On 
this basis, we offer some preliminary suggestions as to, first, the kinds of shape 
taken by city networks and the kinds of activity they represent; and, second, their 
potential to act as a transformative force at a time when much of world politics is 
locked into slow-moving multilateralism. While of course not exhaustive, as the 
overall number of city networks might be higher (possibly over 200), the discus-
sion below is based on what we believe to be a representative sample of this vast 
landscape. The dataset covers 170 city networks globally, extending across cities 
of all sizes and locations on the planet, including large national networks reaching 
up to 20,000 members nationally (as in the United States or India). This sample 
has been selected to represent the geographical, topical and structural variety 
of city networks (national, regional and international, as described below) and, 
we believe, offers a close statistical approximation to the overall picture of city 
networking in 2015.3 This database represents, to the best of our knowledge, the 
largest sample of city networks currently analysed in the literature.
The global landscape of city networking
Today, an important portion of city networking activities can be justifiably 
described as ‘city diplomacy’, in that they constitute mediated ‘international’ 
relations between rightful representatives of polities (cities in this instance), and 
that they result in agreements, collaborations, further institution-building and 
cooperation across boundaries.4 Within the framework of the C40, ‘ambassa-
dors’ of cities (elected mayors, or their peers) such as London or Seoul negotiate 
common frameworks and partake in collective action on behalf of their ‘city-
zens’.5 This is of course a challenging activity, as cities are complex political 
communities of urban dwellers, and the constituencies represented by mayors, 
elected officers and municipal administrations are often highly diverse, to an 
extent that may go beyond national characterizations. For instance, in the UK, 
registered European Union residents generally bear the same rights as citizens 
in electing mayors (as in the Greater London Authority), and in Sweden voting 
for local elections is allowed for all foreign residents with at least three years’ 
residence. Notwithstanding such complexities in their own governance struc-
3 Data were gathered and coded between November 2014 and November 2015 by the City Leadership Initiative 
team at University College London.
4 Rogier van der Pluijm and Jan Melissen, City diplomacy: the expanding role of cities in international politics (Clingen-
dael: Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 2007); Michele Acuto, ‘World politics by other means? 
London, city diplomacy and the Olympics’, Hague Journal of Diplomacy 8: 3–4, 2013, pp. 287–311.
5 For a more extensive discussion of the application of ‘citizenship’ to cities, see, among others, P. B. Wood, 
‘Urban citizenship’, in H. A. van der Heijden, ed., Handbook of political citizenship and social movements (Chelten-
ham: Edward Elgar, 2014), pp. 133–53; Engin F. Isin, Democracy, citizenship and the global city (London: Rout-
ledge, 2013).
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tures, cities are rising to prominence in global governance debates, and the case 
of the C40 is no rarity.6
Nonetheless, a methodical analysis of the networked influence of city diplo-
macy, and ahead of that a systematic account of the landscape of city networks, 
are conspicuously missing from the scholarship. Our aim here is to offer the begin-
nings of such an account, and to offer preliminary consideration of the issues and 
hypotheses that emerge from this diplomacy. As we shall argue, it is critically 
important to develop a more systematic appreciation of the global landscape of 
city networking, reaching beyond topical areas or geographical divisions, in order 
to be in a position to assess their impact, future evolution and potential in global 
governance. For this reason we make here only preliminary suggestions in this 
direction, focusing primarily on offering a possibly unprecedented overview of 
the variety of the city network landscape. However, even at this stage it appears 
possible to test some initial hypotheses emerging not just from the academic litera-
ture but also from the practice of networks such as the C40. 
Specifically, we want to focus particularly on the potential these activities 
might have in offering a networked catalyst for politics beyond the ‘gridlock’ 
affecting most contemporary international institutions, as recently called for 
by Hale, Held and Young.7 By paying attention to the often underappreciated 
realm of city diplomacy, and to the landscape of city networks, we want to raise 
a number of questions as to the possibility that cities might in fact be filling the 
‘governance gap’ identified by Hale and colleagues as a common result of interna-
tional gridlock; a gap ‘in which crucial needs go unmet’ while gridlock becomes a 
‘general condition of the multilateral system’.8 Do city networks have the capacity 
to respond to such relative stasis and offer alternative pathways to cooperation? 
Given the lack of systematic data as a basis on which to begin to answer this 
question, we decided to focus the majority of this article on establishing such a 
basis in order to enable both ourselves (in the latter part of the article) and also, it 
is to be hoped, a wider group of scholars in both IR and urban studies to develop 
a dialogue on the topic.
The present study, developed in the context of the City Leadership Initiative 
at University College London, offers perhaps the first non-topical and system-
atic assessment of the panorama of city networking globally.9 Following well-
established work in environmental studies and health policy, we identified ‘city 
networks’ as formalized organizations with cities as their main members and 
6 While the ramifications for the status of citizenship and sovereignty are indisputably interesting, the princi-
pal focus of this article is more specifically on the networking activity of city diplomacy. For more on the 
complex context of representation and citizens in cities, see the legal work of Yishai Blank on the local/
urban dimension of citizenship: Yishai Blank, ‘Spheres of citizenship’, Theoretical Inquiries in Law 8: 2, 2007, 
pp. 411–52.
7 Thomas Hale, David Held and Kevin Young, Gridlock: why global cooperation is failing when we need it most 
(Cambridge: Polity, 2013), p. 306.
8 Hale et al., Gridlock, p. 3.
9 The City Leadership Initiative (CLI) is a project of University College London in partnership with the World 
Bank and UN-Habitat, also involving collaborations with other major ‘gridlock’ actors such as the World 
Health Organization and the C40. See: http://www.cityleadership.net. (Unless otherwise noted at point of 
citation, all URLs cited in this article were accessible on 1 July 2016.)
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characterized by reciprocal and established patterns of communication, policy-
making and exchange.10 Politically, we define ‘cities’ as local governments (without 
distinction between municipal and metropolitan for the purpose of this research), 
although we recognize in both the database and the article the critical importance 
of other private and governmental forms of authority in urban settlements. So, for 
instance, the C40 is considered a city network because it has a defined member-
ship of local governments, as well as documented regular procedures (and an act 
of establishment). Conversely, we do not include event-based, ad hoc networks 
such as that surrounding the UK’s International Festival for Business, which does 
not have a regular membership despite communication channels and meetings, or 
the Global Cities Business Alliance, which has not yet held a formalized meeting 
and whose members are predominantly business actors.
Carried out through both desktop analysis and a series of qualitative inter-
views, and coded mostly via simple frequency analysis and other basic statistical 
distribution methods, the study is aimed at offering a baseline for more accurately 
grounded discussions of the ‘diplomatic’ impact of cities in global governance. 
This approach is intended to reach beyond issue area biases (as noted below in 
connection with the environment) and towards a more methodical, comparative 
and aggregate programme of city diplomacy research. To this end, this article 
is divided into two parts. In the first, we illustrate the global landscape of city 
networks and make some initial comments on its impact on the ‘gridlock’ discus-
sion initiated by Hale and colleagues. In the second, we argue that, despite the 
path-breaking potential of city diplomacy in global governance, we cannot disre-
gard the ‘unavoidable continuity of the city’ as a domain of political–economic but 
also strongly material path-dependencies.11 This observation is of critical signifi-
cance in responding to Hale and colleagues on the issue of ‘gridlock’. Given their 
argument that gridlock is chiefly prompted by cycles of ‘self-reinforcing interde-
pendence’ which have demanded more and more institutionalization, leading to 
multilateral standstills, the current state of city-based cooperation might be not 
just filling gaps in governance arising from gridlock, but possibly creating new 
path-dependencies.12
The sprawl of city networks raises questions as to the sustainability of the 
increasing number of city diplomacy initiatives. It also highlights the centrality of 
private interests and actors in city diplomacy, generating concerns as to the revolu-
10 See Harriet Bulkeley and Michele Merrill Betsill, Cities and climate change (London: Routledge, 2005), and 
Evelyne de Leeuw, ‘Global and local (glocal) health: the WHO healthy cities programme’, Global Change and 
Human Health 2: 1, 2001, pp. 34–45. Here we have slightly amended the classic definition of transnational 
networks by Keck and Sikkink as ‘forms of organization characterized by voluntary, reciprocal, and hori-
zontal patterns of communication and exchange’: see Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists beyond 
borders: advocacy networks in international politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), p. 8. This latter 
definition might, in fact, be challenged by several of the trends highlighted in the study, which point for 
instance at the internal hierarchies of networks (vs ‘horizontal’ cooperation) or at mandatory participation (vs 
voluntary cooperation) in certain networks. We identify cities as ‘main’ members not to exclude networks 
that also include some (but not a predominant) representation of other local actors like NGOs and regional 
governments.
11 Robert Beauregard and Anne Haila, ‘The unavoidable continuity of the city’, in P. Marcuse and R. van 
Kempen, eds, Globalising cities (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), pp. 22–37.
12 Hale et al., Gridlock, pp. 276–7.
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tionary potential of this activity in world politics and its fragmentation effects. 
Showing that city networking can also contribute to the persistence of existing 
(and even the forging of new) ‘lock-ins’ in global governance, we conclude by 
calling for more systematic attention to be paid to city diplomacy, its lock-ins and 
its futures.
To begin this discussion on the characteristics of city networking, and to 
enable other scholars to draw their own conclusions as to the possible evolu-
tion of this networked landscape, we devote the remainder of this section of the 
article to considerations of form, size and coverage, and the apparent ‘novelty’ of 
city networks, then turning to more normative considerations in the following 
sections.
Form
What form do city networks take? National, state-based organizations (such 
as the US Conference of Mayors) are still dominant, representing some 49 per 
cent of city networks. That said, regional (such as Eurocities) and international 
networks (such as the United Cities and Local Governments, UCLG) are on the 
rise, now accounting respectively for 21 per cent and 29 per cent of the total 
(see figure 1). A limited subset of subnational networks (such as the Key Cities 
group in the UK) accounts for the remainder.13 This, in practice, tells us two main 
things about the impact of city networking on global policy. On the one hand, 
the continuing predominance of national city networks reflects the fact that, in 
an age of global governance fragmentation and non-state-centric discussions on 
world politics, cities still relate substantially to their national peers and central 
governments. In short, national politics still matter for cities. City diplomacy is 
still deeply embedded in the Westphalian system even though, as we have argued 
elsewhere, it predates it.14 Some systems—such as the Italian ANCI (association 
of local governments), which automatically includes Italian comuni (municipali-
ties) as members of the network—are even centrally sanctioned and enrol cities 
of certain sizes in their networks by default. Other systems, however, are formed 
on a voluntary basis and coexist with other parallel networks at similar scales: an 
example is the Key Cities group in the UK, which gathers together 26 medium-
sized municipalities and exists alongside other subnational groupings of British 
cities. This does not mean, however, that city networking within national bound-
aries cannot ‘escape’ the conventional IR great divide between domestic and inter-
national affairs. As we highlight below, city networks themselves can emerge as 
collective actors and negotiate across boundaries.15 Once again, this phenomenon 
13 Smaller geographically defined subnational networks are a minority, but the caveat should be made that 
many of them are either informal groupings or institutionally nearly invisible to the non-indigenous eye. 
The survey accounts for this category through a geographical criterion by including in it only region-specific 
networks (at substate level, e.g. the Italian regione or Brazilian prefeitura), not small membership networks of 
cities dispersed nationally, like the Core Cities network in the UK, which are identified as ‘national’.
14 Michele Acuto, ‘City diplomacy’, in Costas Costantinou, Paul Sharp and Pauline Kerr, eds, The Sage handbook 
of diplomacy (London: Sage, 2016).
15 Michele Acuto, ‘The new climate leaders?’, Review of International Studies 39: 4, 2013, pp. 835–57.
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is not necessarily at odds with the rules of state-centric global governance. The 
World Health Organization (WHO) European Healthy Cities network, for 
instance, is essentially a ‘network of networks’, in which representatives of 30 
European national networks coordinate with one another via the WHO European 
Office, rather than coalescing via a transnational super-network. This proves, at 
least in principle, the feasibility of coexistence with the state-led multilateral 
world. Healthy Cities has in fact had a longstanding tradition of collaboration 
with national governments and with the multilateral structure of WHO itself, 
which has underlain the endurance over a quarter of a century of one of the oldest 
networks of its kind.
Size and coverage
Membership is perhaps the most widely varying characteristic of city networks, 
and one that invites methodological caution. The size of these organizations, as 
noted above, ranges from small selected pools of cities (as with the Cisco-sponsored 
City Protocol on smart cities) to larger international and regional networks, such 
as the Arab Town Organization (22 countries) or the European Forum on Urban 
Security (250 European cities), to even wider national groups. Interestingly, it is 
very difficult to offer an ‘average size’ of network membership without making 
substantial qualitative assumptions and generalizations: many networks do not 
offer complete or updated lists of their members, and this is especially true for 
some larger ones and also, as noted below, some hybrid organizations led by the 
private sector.16 Networks also vary in respect of types of member, from more 
traditional networks formed by cities only, to a mixed type that gathers cities and 
16 These calculations, even as a preliminary overview, require some caution, given the existence of some wide-
membership networks that might skew the actual shape of the landscape. Mathematically the 170 networks 
average 338 members each, but this figure might not be representative of most networks. There is also the 
difficulty of acquiring precise membership data.
Figure 1: Geographical scope of city networks (n = 170)
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associations of cities, such as UCLG, which links over 1,000 local governments but 
also 155 municipal associations. Likewise, it is not uncommon to find cities of very 
different types and sizes assembled in the same organization. This limited consis-
tency in information poses a key challenge both in conducting accurate compara-
tive research and also in offering a clear appreciation of any single city’s networked 
commitments. There are also several networks gathering in their memberships 
cities, quasi-governmental associations and NGOs (business or charities), thus 
presenting complex governing arrangements that, as we note below, contribute 
to hybridizing the structures of transnational cooperation.
As for the topical coverage of policy areas, this is a vast field that cannot be 
reduced, as we argue below, to the often very visible façade of urban environ-
mental action and the success of climate- and sustainability-focused networks. 
While the environment still takes the lion’s share of the activity of city diplo-
macy (29 per cent of networks are principally focused on it), poverty, gender and 
inequality are also prominent concerns (22.8 per cent of networks), somewhat 
ahead of energy and peacebuilding (respectively, 12.4 per cent and 10.6 per cent), 
as shown in figure 2.17 Furthermore, if we consider city networks as vehicles 
for connecting sectors and policy arenas, the picture becomes even more varied 
and interwoven. By our estimates, nearly 71 per cent of city networks could be 
described as ‘multi-purpose’ in that they formally act across at least two major 
areas of policy: these include the US National League of Cities and the Asian 
Network of Major Cities 21, along with most of the instances mentioned thus 
far. Importantly, there is a vast set of specialized networks focusing on all sorts 
of concerns from transparent governance to ageing, youth or education. This, 
in turn, paints a picture of a wide landscape of paradiplomatic action by cities, 
which pervades national, transnational and international agendas to a much more 
substantial extent than the widespread emphasis on cities in action on climate 
change might suggest. Recognition of this variety, and some important signs of 
reflexivity we outline below, are increasingly important elements in the picture of 
city networking. For instance, both WHO Healthy Cities and the C40 have laid 
explicit emphasis on extending the cooperative nature of their primary agendas 
(health in all policies and climate action, respectively) into intersectoral collabora-
tion and multithematic initiatives, such as the C40’s new subnetwork on digital 
democracy for sustainability, or Healthy Cities’ focuses on ageing, cross-regional 
development and city (health) diplomacy. Similar evidence can also be found in 
large networks such as the UCLG, coupling sustainability, economic growth and 
democratic governance, or the Cities Alliance, with a focus on both development 
and capacity-building.
It might, then, be somewhat misleading to infer that the greatest achievements 
of city diplomacy are in those areas where action is most visible. This suggestion 
has clear implications in several policy sectors. Referring back to the observation 
17 These percentages reflect the primary aims of each network as identified in its core statement of intent 
(whether through a charter, website, press release or main document). We omit here what might be an inter-
esting but possibly distracting discussion of specialization of network focus in favour of a central emphasis in 
this article on the wider landscape.
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above on the longevity of some city networks, one must acknowledge the well-
established presence of WHO Healthy Cities, which has now been in place for over 
25 years, with more than 10,000 municipalities under its aegis, and with possibly 
450 million people within its potential policy scope,18 and longstanding campaigns 
such as that of the C40 on climate action, now in place for nearly a decade; such 
sustained activity also reverberates at national level, with, for example, the UK 
Core Cities group serving as a continuing advocate for devolution and the Federa-
tion of Canadian Municipalities having long promoted gender balance in public 
administration. 
These observations also point to a need to overcome the assumption that city 
diplomacy is perhaps less ‘central’ to classical IR concerns like security. Certainly 
one of the most classical examples of city networking, the Mayors for Peace 
initiative, gathering over 5,000 cities in 152 countries, has for more than three 
decades (since 1982) been a sustained voice in several non-proliferation advocacy 
and lobbying activities. While similar examples of direct overlap with classical 
security challenges might still be limited and centred on advocacy rather than 
policy-making, it is certainly now possible to point to a growing number of 
city diplomacy efforts serving important traditional and non-traditional security 
purposes. One example is work of the Municipal Alliance for Peace in the 
Middle East (MAP) in seeking reconciliation in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. 
As Chris van Hemert has emphasized in relation to this process, ‘the deadlock 
at the national/international level result[ed] in local-level dialogue and munic-
ipal projects being seen as attractive alternatives’.19 We could therefore argue that 
18 De Leeuw, ‘Global and local (glocal) health’.
19 Chris van Hemert. ‘A case study in city diplomacy’, in Arne Musch, Chris van der Valk, Alexandra Sizoo 
Figure 2: Subject focus of city networks (n = 170)
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multilateral (and also bilateral) gridlock might be a major determinant in the 
formation of city networks. No clear data are available in the network’s statements 
to serve as a quantitative basis for this assertion; nevertheless, it is evident from 
the rhetoric of many popular networks such as the C40, ICLEI—Local Govern-
ments for Sustainability and UCLG, among others, that the limits of interstate 
diplomacy are driving city diplomacy initiatives aimed at filling governance gaps. 
Environmental sector networks have been very active in capturing media atten-
tion and showcasing what can be achieved through such steps beyond gridlock, 
for example in the C40’s flagship report Climate action in megacities, now in its third 
edition.20 More research as well as more visible self-reporting on the impact of 
city networking in other sectors are needed.
Novelty vs continuity
A common mistake often made in sensationalist reiterations of the ‘urban age’ 
mantra is to represent the proactivity of cities today in terms of novelty. City 
networking is not a new phenomenon. In fact, city networks are on average over 
30 years old, and have progressively expanded their topical coverage, from matters 
of public transport to environmental action and international peacebuilding, 
spanning several decades. So while there is indeed a clear trend towards the expan-
sion of networking, with 24 per cent of all networks having emerged in the last 
decade, and indeed at least eight new international and regional networks in the 
three years from 2013 to 2015, it cannot be maintained that city networking is a 
historically new reality (see figure 3). Some networks, such as the transnational 
International City Management Association (founded in 1914) or the US Confer-
ence of Mayors (founded in 1932), are well-established presences in national and 
international governance processes. Nearly 17 per cent of city networks, especially 
those of a national nature, were founded more than 60 years ago, essentially 
predating the Cold War and, in a number of cases, even the Second World War.21 
This has important implications for the way in which we should conceive of city 
diplomacy in world politics. While it is certainly clear that several new networks 
are reinventing or innovating forms of city-to-city and ‘polylateral’ engagement 
(that is, between cities and states, business and other layers of government), there 
are also numerous strands of well-established policy collaboration that have been 
institutionalizing the practices of city diplomacy.22 So, for instance, while the C40 
group is stepping up industry collaboration and data development to assess the 
impact of action on climate change by its 83 member cities, including for example 
collaborations with ARUP or the Carbon Disclosure Project, the ICLEI—Local 
and Kian Tajbakhsh, City diplomacy: the role of local governments in conflict prevention, peace-building, post-conflict 
reconstruction. (The Hague: VNG International), 2008, p. 188.
20 C40 and ARUP, Climate Action in Megacities 3.0 (CAM 3.0) (London: C40 and ARUP, Dec. 2015). CLI has been 
directly involved in the production of this report, which is available at http://cam3.c40.org. 
21 In principle, this reasoning could be extended to the archetypes of modern city networking to demonstrate 
that, just like city diplomacy, city networks were in place long before the advent of the Westphalian system.
22 Stuart Murray, Paul Sharp, Geoffrey Wiseman, David Criekemans and Jan Melissen, ‘The present and future 
of diplomacy and diplomatic studies’, International Studies Review 13: 4, 2011, pp. 709–28.
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Governments for Sustainability network has been a regular source of monitoring 
and in-depth case-studies of urban environmental performance over the past 25 
years. ICLEI belongs, in fact, to the phase of rapid expansion in the modern type 
of city networks: over 58 per cent of city networks are between 10 and 30 years 
old, mapping onto the broader proliferation of transnational initiatives that has 
taken place within global governance since the late 1970s.
In short, then, city networks are a well-institutionalized phenomenon that 
presents scholars and practitioners of international relations with complex histor-
ical ramifications. Yet, when considering the emergence of city networks over the 
last century, and attempting to identify the ‘birth dates’ of existing initiatives, it 
is undeniable that a marked growth can be detected over the last two decades: 
about 60 of the 170 networks under consideration in this study were in place by 
1985; this number had nearly doubled by the late 1990s (to around 120 by 1999), 
and appears to be growing still.23 
A key question already raised in environmental politics by Kristine Kern and 
Harriet Bulkeley is that of a ‘switch’ into the type of networks whose emergence 
we are now witnessing.24 In short, is there a ‘new generation’ of city networking? 
City networks as represented in this study are, as outlined above, of varying forms 
and orientations, and might represent only the (institutionalized) tip of the iceberg 
of city-to-city cooperation and cross-boundary municipal initiatives. The scale of 
the well-recognized practice of ‘city twinning’, for instance, is likely to be far 
23 As a proportion of the existent networks by year of birth. Not represented here, and of certain analytical and 
policy importance, is the issue of ‘birth and death’ of city networks and the reasons behind the emergence 
and decline of these city diplomacy initiatives.
24 Kristine Kern and Harriet Bulkeley, ‘Cities, Europeanization and multi-level governance: governing climate 
change through transnational municipal networks’, Journal of Common Market Studies 47: 2, 2009, pp. 309–32.
Figure 3: Numbers of networks per year, 1885–2015
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more widespread even than is thought to be the case and still mostly unaccounted 
for; and, as Mark Jayne and colleagues argue, it could provide fertile ground for 
analysis of contemporary urban processes.25 However, traditional city-twinning 
networks, such as Sister Cities International (SCI), have themselves stepped from 
narrowly defined ‘city-to-city cooperation’ (between cities) to a wider ‘city diplo-
macy’ (between cities and between cities and other non-municipal actors). Some 
of these networks are shifting from an emphasis on the importance of twinning 
to an emphasis on the importance of strategy and alliance capability.26 The form 
and orientation of current city networks have therefore been going well beyond 
twinning: city networks are being constructed in partnership with actors other 
than municipal governments, such as the UN, the World Bank or the EU, and 
are increasingly intertwined with the cross-national action of the private sector 
that in some cases is initiating such city networking efforts. Overall, the tradi-
tional presence of city networking over time, its changing remit and cross-cutting 
action, along with its growth and increased intertwining with the private sector 
and multilateral entities, all indicate the importance of paying attention to the 
results of these activities and indeed what kind of politics city networking is 
inscribing into the texture of global governance. Here, rather than focusing on the 
‘novelty’ aspect of the ‘rise’ of the urban age, we want to offer some preliminary 
thoughts on the political consequences and material influence of city networking.
‘Locking in’ city networking?
City networking is certainly not just a matter of politics. The ways in which cities 
connect with and relate to each other, and trade (or indeed steal) ideas, are central 
to charting the physical shape of an increasingly urbanized age. In this sense, it is 
crucial to appreciate what sort of ‘urban-ness’ is being built, materially as much 
as politically, by the mass of networking activities under way. This is because 
cities are arguably one of the most critical domains of societal path-dependency 
and ‘lock-ins’. We speak of ‘lock-in’ when a decision-making (or more broadly 
societal) path-dependency is maintained by a particular dominant technology. 
This, as organizational studies and science and technology studies (STS) tell us, 
is not necessarily because of any inherently low-cost or highly effective perfor-
mance, but may be simply because the dominant technology enjoys the benefits of 
increasing returns to scale resulting from its very dominance. A typical example 
of socio-technical lock-in is that of the QWERTY keyboard, as illustrated by Paul 
David.27 The idea of technology ‘locking in’ societal practices is of course well 
25 See Mark Jayne, Phil Hubbard and David Bell, ‘Worlding a city: twinning and urban theory’, City 15: 1, 2011, 
pp. 25–41; Wilbur Zelinsky, ‘The twinning of the world: sister cities in geographic and historical perspective’, 
Annals of the Association of American Geographers 81: 1, 1991, pp. 1–31; Pertti Joenniemi and Alexander Sergunin, 
‘When two aspire to become one: city-twinning in northern Europe’, Journal of Borderlands Studies 26: 2, 2011, 
pp. 231–42.
26 J. C. de Villiers, ‘Success factors and the city-to-city partnership management process: from strategy to alli-
ance capability’, Habitat International 33: 2, 2009, pp. 149–56.
27 See Paul A. David, ‘Clio and the economics of QWERTY’, American Economic Review 75: 2, 1985, pp. 332–7. 
See also Stan J. Liebowitz and Stephen E. Margolis, ‘Path-dependence, lock-in, and history’, Journal of Law, 
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established, and is easily transferable to the domain of policy-making—a very 
common move in management studies and (especially) decision theory, but also 
in economic geography and STS. Practices and institutions set up in particular 
historical contexts (as with city twinning across the Cold War eastern and western 
blocs), and reflecting particular geopolitical interests (as with the private sector’s 
increasing interest in cities as alternative business partners beyond central govern-
ment), can become locked in and have repercussions over many decades, if not 
centuries.
These urban path-dependencies are far from ‘extraordinary’. Typical of devel-
oped and developing cities the world over are locked-in systems of sanitation, 
for example the inefficient and potentially unsustainable dominance of potable 
water toilet flushes, as well as massive structures for mobility and connectivity that 
currently lock in the potential policy pathways ahead of us. Examples of lock-in 
can be found throughout today’s built environment. For instance, the air condi-
tioner is one of the technologies that have altered the shape of urbanism in the 
modern era. It is indisputable that the introduction of air-conditioning systems 
has enabled human society to overcome natural climatic limitations, not just in 
extreme contexts like the Arab Gulf but also in the increasingly dense realities of 
many metropolises, transforming major urban centres and pushing towards the 
homogenization of architecture.28 One of the less widely advertised, and yet most 
critical, dimensions of the long-lived impact of urbanization is in fact that urban 
settlements embody a very real path-dependency and continuity in society. Cities 
are perhaps the quintessential realm where, to paraphrase a popular assertion in 
STS, society is ‘made durable’ by being stabilized and perpetuated throughout the 
ebbs and flows of societal changes over time.29
The relevant question for our study of city networking, then, is what ‘kind’ 
of urban age politics this mass of transnational activity is likely to inscribe into 
the very real skeleton of concrete and wires defining our everyday urban life. As 
we write, important geopolitical shifts are being locked into the mundane reali-
ties of the many cities partaking in city diplomacy. City networks are a perfect 
vehicle for the connection of similar, and the spread of new, lock-ins that allow 
certain ‘models’ of urbanism to work in one place and move to another.30 As 
the geographical ‘policy mobility’ literature tells us, technology travels with ideas 
and particular politics are embedded in such ideas.31 Critically, this allows for the 
Economics, and Organization 11: 1, 1995, pp. 205–26; W. Brian Arthur, ‘Competing technologies, increasing 
returns, and lock-in by historical events’, Economic Journal 99: 394, 1989, pp. 116–31. We have discussed this 
point in relation to urbanization in Heike Schroeder, Sarah Burch and Steve Rayner, ‘Novel multisector 
networks and entrepreneurship in urban climate governance’, Environment and Planning C: Government and 
Policy 31: 5, 2013, pp. 761–8, and in Maximilian Mayer and Michele Acuto, ‘The global governance of large 
technical systems’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 43: 2, 2015, pp. 660–83.
28 Gail Cooper, Air-conditioning America: engineers and the controlled environment, 1900–1960 (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2002).
29 Bruno Latour, ‘Technology is society made durable’, Sociological Review 38: S1, 1990, pp. 103–31.
30 Jamie Peck and Nik Theodore, ‘Mobilizing policy: models, methods, and mutations’, Geoforum 41: 2, 2010, 
pp. 169–74.
31 Allan Cochrane and Kevin Ward, ‘Guest editorial. Researching the geographies of policy mobility: confront-
ing the methodological challenges’, Environment and Planning A 44: 1, 2012, pp. 5–12.
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politics within and among cities, as well as the politics within city networks, to 
be embedded and over time subsumed apolitically in technocratic discourses and 
technological innovations that travel through networks and embed (geo)political 
alignments into the concrete matter of these cities.32
Considering the impact of city diplomacy not just in its ‘novelty’ but also in 
its locking-in consequences is central to a better understanding of the role of city 
networks. The next step is to apply this ‘visceral’ sense of locking in to the domain 
of governance ( just as organizational theory does with policy-making). With 
socio-technical lock-ins come governance arrangements and political structures 
that contingently (owing to the often transnational nature of city networking) 
shape urban and global governance for the long term. In particular, there are two 
key considerations to do with path-dependencies that emerge from an overview 
of the global landscape of city networking. First, city diplomacy is potentially 
locking in new modes of ‘hybrid’ public policy, recasting the geopolitics of global 
governance. As new (or retrofitted) infrastructure is put in place via public–private 
schemes, so are new (or retrofitted) models of urban governance.33 Second, city 
networks are locking in the material consequences of these modes of governing, 
which in turn could structure in the long term the shape of everyday life in cities 
well beyond the lifespan of the networks and the political cycles on which they 
are based.
Locking in hybrid governance
Considering the wider landscape of city networks entails accounting for cities as 
deeply involved in the practice of governing twenty-first-century cross-border 
challenges. As noted above, this involvement might be locking in new modes of 
‘hybrid’ governance shaping these modes of cooperation. City diplomacy is path-
dependent on its longstanding tradition. Yet a new generation of city networking 
might also change the long-term shape of governance ‘from the middle’ (neither 
‘bottom up’ like civil society, nor through the ‘high politics’ of states) that seems 
to be so effectively sprawling amid cities.34
In this context it is necessary to point out how the structural footprint of city 
networks and of city diplomacy is (re)casting the shape of transnational govern-
ance. The way city networks are organized has an impact on the dynamics of 
how regional, international and even global processes are embedded by local 
governments and private actors. As such, city networks might already consti-
tute a powerful force shaping the ‘governance gap’ of which Hale and colleagues 
write in Gridlock. In particular, city networks push beyond government politics 
into highly complex ‘hybrid’ (public–private) governance arrangements, and also 
32 Steve Rayner, ‘The rise of risk and the decline of politics’, Environmental Hazards 7: 2, 2007, pp. 165–72; Sofie 
Bouteligier, ‘Inequality in new global governance arrangements: the North–South divide in transnational 
municipal networks’, Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research 26: 3, 2013, pp. 251–67.
33 See e.g. Mike Hodson and Simon Marvin, eds, Retrofitting cities: priorities, governance and experimentation 
(London: Earthscan, 2016).
34 Mikael Román, ‘Governing from the middle: the C40 Cities Leadership Group’, Corporate Governance: The 
International Journal of Business in Society 10: 1, 2010, pp. 73–84.
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into innovative modes of cooperation between cities as subnational actors. Our 
study has revealed that, while just over half (54.2 per cent) of the networks are still 
single-tiered, that is, centred on a single secretariat leading the whole organization, 
a substantial proportion (30 per cent) operate in two-tiered (with sub-networks) 
or even pluralized (15.8 per cent) forms of networked governance (see figure 4).
All this activity has a direct influence on many of the core institutions of world 
politics, from sovereignty to the UN system. To date, however, this influence has 
been acknowledged only by scholars of environmental politics and some health 
policy academics, having been essentially ignored in other fields of academia and in 
much of practical national policy-making. The important point in relation to the 
core multilateral structures of global governance is that the current proliferation 
of city networks has the capacity to further lock in ‘fragmented’ forms of govern-
ance, as a commonplace response to the limits of the state system.35 This does not, 
however, always result in more and more institutionalized fragmentation, which 
would directly replicate multilateral gridlock in city diplomacy: as qualitative work 
on our dataset shows, many initiatives remain semi-formal, with varying degrees of 
regular meetings or established procedures for intra-network operations, and the 
involvement of the private sector often has depoliticizing effects on the operation 
of these networks, pushing them even further into technical and market-driven 
cooperation and away from government and governance. More investigation of 
this relationship is central to better understanding the revolutionary potential of 
city networks, and their practice of diplomacy in general, in relation to twenty-
first-century ‘gridlocks’. City diplomacy initiatives seem to be commonly subject 
to fragmentation, a core ‘pathway to gridlock’ highlighted by Hale and colleagues, 
rather than promoting intersectoral and cross-network forms of collaboration. This 
is an important issue to which we return in the next section.36
35 Frank Biermann, Philipp Pattberg, Harro Van Asselt and Fariborz Zelli, ‘The fragmentation of global govern-
ance architectures: a framework for analysis’, Global Environmental Politics 9: 4, 2009, pp. 14–40.
36 Hale et al., Gridlock, p. 35.
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Figure 4: The structure of city networks (n = 170)
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Considering the form of governance of city networks tells us much about 
how policies, partnerships and innovations circulate among cities, and about how 
power relations are (re)cast between cities, corporate actors and multilateral bodies 
in a fragmented context of global governance. While the one-tiered mode of city 
networking still reflects the traditional mode of transnational governance, as in 
some advocacy networks such as UNESCO’s Learning Cities Network, which 
pushes for inclusive education of all urban-dwellers, city diplomacy has been 
taking important steps towards specialization, with two-tiered networks offering 
international coverage but also concrete sub-coalitions with specialist applications. 
Specialization offers greater opportunities for engagement of multiple cities in 
specific applications, experimentation and cross-boundary collaboration beyond 
the larger advocacy role of city diplomacy. Equally, it offers the advantages 
of pooled procurement and specialized multi-country markets for the private 
sector.37 This is the case for the C40’s or ICLEI’s sub-networks on, for instance, 
low-emission vehicles and local renewables, linking elements of the networks’ 
membership and attracting specific business interests in transport and environ-
mental services.
This consideration is key to linking governance lock-ins to their material 
manifestations on the streets of cities the world over. The role of the private sector 
(mainly business, but also not-for-profit organizations, both advocacy NGOs and 
philanthropic bodies) in city networking is expanding. Large industry bodies, 
huge corporations and now even smaller enterprises are increasingly plugged into 
the business of cities.38 If we consider the major driver for the original estab-
lishment of a subset of the networks in our database, while city-led initiatives 
lay behind the majority (58 per cent), NGO-led efforts, mostly prompted by 
the private sector, account for a considerable 19 per cent of the total, only just 
behind efforts led by intergovernmental organizations such as UN agencies (23 per 
cent).39 However, we should not prima facie dismiss pluralization as a complete and 
unconditional surrender to the compromises of liberal internationalism resulting 
from the capacity of large corporate actors to sway the direction and focus of city 
networking, or to the easy association of pluralist governance with fragmentation 
problems.40 More radical cases of pluralized governance can offer a case for effec-
tive decentralization. Examples include the Partnership for Democratic Govern-
ance in south-east Asia, and a few nationally based networks (e.g. in El Salvador 
or Finland), which indicate the capacity of certain forms of city networking to 
decentralize action while maintaining coordination and unity in scope.41 The 
37 Román, ‘Governing from the middle’; Acuto, ‘The new climate leaders?’.
38 We borrow the expression from the extensive work in this sphere by our colleagues Greg Clark, Emily Moir 
and Tim Moonen. See Greg Clark and Emily Moir, ‘The business of cities’, research essay for the UK govern-
ment’s Foresight Future of Cities project (London: Government Office for Science, Oct. 2014), https://www.
gov.uk/government/publications/future-of-cities-the-business-of-cities.
39 Given the need to delve deeper (via document analysis and even some qualitative interviews) to appreciate 
this dimension, this analysis is based on a representative subset of 60 of the 170 networks analysed, of which 
30 instances were city-led (e.g. C40 Group), 15 NGO-led (e.g. UITP, the International Association of Public 
Transport) and 15 IGO-led (e.g. WHO Healthy Cities).
40 Steven F. Bernstein, The compromise of liberal environmentalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001).
41 It is perhaps not surprising that the large majority of ‘pluralized’ forms of city network governance are gener-
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landscape of ‘new’ modes of governance currently being recast and possibly 
locked into the politics of urban affairs is therefore vast. This trend should not 
be reduced to simplistic accounts of a totalizing neo-liberalization; it can also 
explain important differences from the gridlocked interdependence of multilater-
alism. We need better to understand when and why cities network formally, what 
models of cooperation are ‘sticking’ as path-dependencies at multiple governance 
layers from supranational to subnational, and how cities choose to engage with 
the formal core of global governance as constituted by, for example, the UN, the 
OECD and the World Bank, or by contrast to network informally. These politics 
might tell us much about the direction of global governance in an urban age. 
Equally, they might encourage scholars of international affairs to engage more 
systematically with the materiality and the large technical systems at the heart of 
many contemporary questions of world politics.42 It is clear that these organiza-
tions have the potential to leave important path-dependencies inscribed not only 
in the way cities relate to each other (and beyond) politically, but also in the very 
concrete shapes of urbanization.
The consequences of city diplomacy
It is a point of critical importance, then, especially in view of the path- 
dependencies that city networks are imprinting onto the contemporary face of 
politics, that city diplomacy is most certainly not just about summitry. City 
networks are locking in the effects of city diplomacy on the ground of these 
cities, where governance is embodied in concrete, steel and stabilized everyday 
dwelling practices. The results of all of this city diplomacy do not end with its 
very visible imagery of mayors, public speeches and international events: there 
is a conspicuous ‘experimental’ activity of joint initiatives, for example to curb 
greenhouse gas emissions or encourage fair planning.43 City networks produce 
regular reports (in 45 per cent of cases), joint pilots and policies (38 per cent) 
and information exchanges (37 per cent issuing newsletters, 9 per cent publishing 
magazines or journals, and 24 per cent maintaining blogs, social media accounts 
or online noticeboards) linking cities and spreading information, so it would be 
profoundly misleading to represent them, and the broader enterprise of city diplo-
macy, as expressed solely through the conferences reported in news magazines and 
blogs (see figure 5). Of course, this does not mean that the public diplomacy (or 
propaganda) function played by mayors and city leaders on these ‘world stages’ 
is no more than marginal; but it is fair to assert that the vast landscape of city 
networking is far deeper and more significant than simple branding. 
ally focused on working on issues to do with democratic accountability and action to counter inequality. 
Curiously—and this is a point worthy of further investigation—this form of governance seems to be more 
common in Asia, south-east Asia in particular, than in the traditional ‘global North’ contexts of Europe and 
North America.
42 Mayer and Acuto, ‘The global governance of large technical systems’.
43 E.g. Maarten Hajer and Arnold Reijndorp. In search of new public domain (Rotterdam: NAI, 2001).
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City diplomacy does not end in network-making, involving as it does the 
production of a vast variety of documentation, policy, collaborative pilots and 
more, while also still maintaining alternative ‘sister city’, summit or one-off 
diplomatic channels. Even SCI, perhaps the most frequently cited case of this 
kind of city-to-city cooperation, is today revising its activities and governance 
mode in the direction of more complex and hybrid networking. Research on 
this ‘hybridization’ of city networking and its broader reverberations in global 
governance is, of course, much needed and still widely underdeveloped. Nonethe-
less, environmental studies analyses have already made substantial strides into 
the path-dependent consequences of the volume of city diplomacy currently 
in place. For instance, Harriet Bulkeley and Vanesa Castán Broto have recently 
highlighted the centrality to the exercise of (local) government of climate change 
‘experiments’ that translate political action into concrete socio-technical struc-
tures ‘on the ground’.44 Experimentation and piloting, so common now in many 
city networks, serve to create ‘new forms of political space within the city, as 
public and private authority blur, and are primarily enacted through forms of 
technical intervention in infrastructure networks’.45 In these ways, cities seem to 
be acquiring greater room for manoeuvre in what can effectively be implemented 
through city diplomacy, while at the same time embedding important forms of 
public–private governance inherent in the delivery of these experiments and their 
extension into metropolitan and regional initiatives.
On top of these considerations, it is important to stress that networks are also 
becoming regular gateways through which business actors can make connections 
not just with individual cities but also within pools of cities (offering networked 
windows into market opportunities). While not discounting the importance of 
44 Harriet Bulkeley and Vanesa Castán Broto, ‘Government by experiment? Global cities and the governing of 
climate change’, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 38: 3, 2013, pp. 361–75.
45 Bulkeley and Castán Broto, ‘Government by experiment?, p. 361.
Figure 5: Outputs of city networks (n = 170)
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industry and business actors in delivering effective services at the municipal level, 
it is critical to pay more explicit attention to this process in the wider landscape 
of city networking. The attractiveness of city diplomacy, as noted above, is 
the opportunity it offers to reach widely disparate markets via a single group 
of networked cities, as in the case of the C40, ICLEI or UCLG sub-networks. 
Likewise, city networking offers a chance for key for-profit international actors 
such as Google and Microsoft to link into other domains of action, for example 
through their collaboration with the Emerging and Sustainable Cities initiative 
on infrastructure. However, as analysts of city networks have already pointed 
out, this process raises important geopolitical concerns: what lines of legitimacy 
and what forms of accountability are being inscribed into this more-than-local 
governance of urbanization? What North–South divides and big-business–small-
business gaps are opening up in the sprawl of city networking?46 Or, to paraphrase 
a popular recent book on the issue, if city diplomacy is a gateway for mayors to 
‘rule the world’, at what price might this ruling come to fruition?47 Of course, 
these are all critical questions whose analytical depth we have only begun to 
plumb; they deserve further consideration not only from scholars but also from 
practitioners in multilateral organizations and city diplomats themselves.
From gridlock to lock-in?
Considering political and material lock-ins in cities raises a central concern as to 
the issue of gridlock. Can cities overcome the limitations of the international 
system while offering innovative modes of cooperation, or is much of the city 
networking in place today simply replacing the problem of gridlock with the 
problem of unscrutinized lock-in? And, in this sense, what can the study of inter-
national affairs offer to such a complex but critical landscape of urban action?
To begin with, methodological study and broad views of global governance can 
help us make sense of the big (political) picture of this urban influence on world 
politics.48 For example, as Emilie Hafner-Burton and colleagues have pointed 
out, network analysis holds much promise in international studies, in that it can 
highlight persistent patterns in and emergent properties of the networked struc-
tures of city diplomacy.49 Symptomatic of the advances of environmental studies 
on this front, some preliminary enquiries in this direction have already begun; 
equal and comparative efforts are required in the fields of security, health and 
46 Taedong Lee, ‘Global cities and transnational climate change networks’, Global Environmental Politics 13: 1, 2013, 
pp. 108–27. The same point is made in Bouteligier, ‘Inequality in new global governance arrangements’, p. 
252.
47 Benjamin R. Barber, If mayors ruled the world: dysfunctional nations, rising cities (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2013).
48 As argued in relation to the validity of global governance research by Thomas G. Weiss and Rorden Wilkin-
son, ‘Global governance to the rescue: saving international relations?’, Global Governance 20: 1, 2014, pp. 19–36.
49 Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Miles Kahler and Alexander H. Montgomery, ‘Network analysis for international 
relations’, International Organization 63: 3, 2009, pp. 559–92. It is unfortunately beyond the scope of this prelim-
inary overview to offer a more refined network analysis of city networks—a task of critical importance in 
deeper investigation of the dynamics of city diplomacy.
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culture, to name but a few areas.50 Similar thinking, possibly well aligned with 
‘assemblage thinking’ in IR, can also be applied to efforts to understand how the 
‘networked politics’ of city diplomacy allows the networks themselves to emerge 
as actors on the international stage, thus offering a finer sensibility to scalar consid-
erations in the story of how cities interact with global governance.51 A better 
understanding of the landscape of city networking can for example inform more 
systematic qualitative comparative analyses (QCAs) of city diplomacy, which 
in turn can maximize the number of comparisons that can be made across the 
network cases under investigation here via inferential logic.52 More constructivist 
and sociological approaches to international studies could also allow for a better 
investigation of the causal linkages between the ‘theatre diplomacy’ aspect of city 
summitry or cooperation and the vast piloting agency highlighted above as an 
experimental result of much of this transnational activity.53 Thus the field is ripe 
for engagement and the tools at hand sharp enough to cut through the vast body 
of material we have begun to unpack with this dataset.
This is of course no purely theoretical enterprise. As the discussion above 
makes clear, it is imperative to open up the often hidden governance of city 
diplomacy as it is practised on the ground of today’s major metropolises. Consid-
ering the landscape of city networks and the possibilities of city diplomacy, then, 
becomes also an exercise in highlighting the responsibilities of city leaders the 
world over towards their urban citizenry. Decisions, policies and politics, and not 
least inequalities and societal modi operandi are locked into the steel and concrete 
of today’s metropolises, and likely to remain in place long after those who are 
networking cities today have gone. The implication of this line of reasoning is, 
in fact, a potentially normative one: city leaders should be held accountable for 
the lock-ins being built in the material texture of their cities and the institutional 
skeleton of global governance. If city diplomacy is after all contingent on the 
mediated transnational relations among cities, and between cities and other inter-
national actors, as conducted by representatives of these very cities (mayors and the 
like), then we should strive for these ambassadors of the ‘urban age’ to own the 
lock-ins to which they subscribe. 
Some promising steps in the right direction, not just in terms of policy but also 
in terms of thoroughly depicting the landscape of the networked action of cities, 
have emerged in the last few years. For example, WHO Healthy Cities recently 
published a peer-reviewed evaluation of its ‘phase V’ (2009–2013), led by recog-
nized academics in policy network analysis and, most importantly, containing an 
50 Philipp Pattberg and Oscar Widerberg, ‘Transnational multistakeholder partnerships for sustainable develop-
ment: conditions for success’, Ambio 45: 1, 2016, pp. 42–51.
51 This emergent effect is discussed in Acuto, ‘The new climate leaders?’, and, more broadly, in Miles Kahler, 
ed., Networked politics: agency, power, and governance (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015). On assemblage 
thinking, see Michele Acuto and Simon Curtis, ‘Assemblage thinking and international relations’, in Reas-
sembling international theory (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), pp. 1–15.
52 Benoît Rihoux and Charles C. Ragin, Configurational comparative methods: qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) 
and related techniques (London: Sage, 2009).
53 Carl Death, ‘Summit theatre: exemplary governmentality and environmental diplomacy in Johannesburg and 
Copenhagen’, Environmental Politics 20: 1, 2011, pp. 1–19.
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explicit discussion of the quality of the data, city responsiveness, and the realist 
synthesis approach deployed in its ‘phase V’ reporting.54 Similar steps have been 
taken recently by the C40 in partnership with engineering consultancy ARUP and 
a few research centres including the Stockholm Environment Institute and Univer-
sity College London, and in the research conducted by the Global Observatory 
on Local Democracy and Decentralization (GOLD) of UCLG. Even so, while 
general practice seems encouraging, with 23.9 per cent of the networks observed 
producing regular reporting material, more could be done in the reflexive dimen-
sion (on methods, capacities and research needs) charted for instance by WHO 
Healthy Cities. These self-assessments might also provide the basis for impor-
tant connections between cities, multilateral bodies and academics in the years 
to come. The level of their critical and reflexive approach remains, however, to 
be tested. As the structural implications of city diplomacy appear, at least on the 
basis of preliminary investigation in this database, to be substantial, widespread 
and cross-cutting, it seems only appropriate to urge that greater attention be paid 
to the influence of city networking in international affairs.
54 Evelyne de Leeuw, Geoff Green, Agis Tsouros, Mariana Dyakova, Jill Farrington, Johan Faskunger and 
Marcus Grant, ‘Healthy Cities phase V evaluation: further synthesizing realism’, Health Promotion International 
30: suppl. 1, 2015, pp. i118–i125.
